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DEATH BY DEFINITION
MELVIN F. WINGERSKY

following Sir Edward Coke, stated with deceptive
conceptual simplicity that common law murder is when "a
person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any
reasonable creature in being, and under the King's peace, with malice
aforethought, either express or implied." 1 That recordation in the
Commentaries is a social communication objectifying proscribed and
punishable behavior. What Blackstone reported partially defines the
term "murder," not a murder; his expression denotes a situation, and
it is impersonal. When some American States early adapted and
promulgated such a communication in the indicative mood, the description was elevated to the status of universal legal validity within
the particular community. The punishment to be imposed under such
legal prescription frequently is death.
In the course of his trenchant dissent reported as part of Fisher v.
United States,2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter tells us:
LACKSTONE,

The division of murder into degrees arose from the steadily weakened hold
of capital punishment on the conscience of mankind.... The crime of murder
was divided into two classes, in some States very early, in recognition of the fact
that capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result
of premeditation and deliberation. It is this consideration that has led most of the
States to divide common law murder into two crimes....

Grading the common law offense of murder by categorizing it into
two degrees-a dichotomy unknown at English common law-was
first accomplished by legislative action in Pennsylvania during 1794.
Murder has never been defined by statute in Pennsylvania; it appears to remain "common law murder," following substantially the
Blackstone definition. Malice, express or implied, is the criterion and
indispensable element of common law murder.
Under the Pennsylvania statute, a killing
1 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 195. See Report, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1953), Cmd. 8932 at 25-26.
2 328 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1946). Footnotes of thc Court omitted.
MR. ,VINGERSKY is Associate Professor of Law at De Paul University College of Law.
He received his S.I.D. at Northwestern University and is the reviser of the Sixth Edition
of "A Treatise on the Law of Crimes" CLARK AND MARSHALL (1958).
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. committed in the perpetration of, or [while] attempting to perpetrate any

the first degree.
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping, shall be murder in
degree. 3

All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second

This statutory provision regarding "felony-murder," so-called, underlies seven significant Pennsylvania cases decided between 1947 and
1958.
Having long since forbidden murder through common law and
statutory mandates, society entrusts assorted persons, acting in its
name and on its behalf, with the complex problem of categorizing
human behavior patterns of a past particular moment to ascertain
whether such behavior is to be punished. Neither the moment nor tile
specific behavior can be recaptured with absolute certainty. The fact
finders neither observe nor experience (nor do they need to) the event
upon which they will pass judgment. Personal categories, theoretically
divested of status, are replaced by protocol statements about murder
for the official purpose of reaching a verdict on the guilt or innocence
of the accused person. By drawing inferences from evidence introduced
at a trial under an indictment for murder, it is presupposed that there
are adequate applicable standards for assessing multiple external facts.
Actually, conclusions of the fact finders concern a combination of
external happenings and the inferences drawn from them, measured
by the yardsticks of common law, statute and case law.
Constructive malice, vague in concept but drastic in application
under common law, is a decisive cue for categorizing as murder homicides occurring during perpetration of certain felonies (at least those
involving violence), or in resisting an officer. The constructive malice
theory declares that the accused person's intent to commit the felony
or resist the officer manifests the malice required in the definition of
murder. Clearly the felony-murder doctrine facilitates the conviction
of persons accused of murder because of two aspects: (1) the prosecution's case is legally implemented by the implication of malice; and
(2) instructions couched in terms of the doctrine probably aid in
achieving persuasion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in instances
where the jury might otherwise hesitate to convict for murder. A
jury, it would seem, is easily convinced that it is convicting an accused
a See Appendix A.
Murder in Pennsylvania was first judicially defined in Coin. v. Drum, 38 Pa. 9, 15
(1868). See the memorandum submitted by Professor L. B. Schwartz, Punishment of
Murder in Pennsylvania, to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1 Memoranda and Replies 776 (1952).
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for his voluntary behavior, though in numerous instances the actual
fatal act is performed by a co-conspirator, co-felon or a third person,
because of the resemblance of the doctrine to automatic or strict
liability for murder. There is, unfortunately, an attractive and convenient rationalization, especially appealing to laymen, resting on the
theory that having intended to commit a felony an accused should be
responsible as a matter of law for all results.
To discover the practical effects of the common law conception of
murder this article focuses on Commonwealth v. Moyer,4 Commonwealth v. Almeida, Commonwealth v. Lowry," Commonwealth v.
Bolish,7 Commonwealth v. Thomas," Commonwealth v. Redline,9 and

Commonwealth v. Bolish,10 all cases impressed with the felony-murder
doctrine, and from each of which the operative facts are stated later.
Before reaching those factual situations several elementary principles
must be recalled. Consider first the charge of murder lodged against
these defendants, stated in the indictments, and for the proof of which
the prosecution has the initial burden of going forward with evidence
to make its case against them. Assuming, of course, the corpus delicti
is established, and the state's evidence demonstrates a hold-up (except in the two Bolisb cases where the felony charged was arson), was
in perpetration, or had been perpetrated, there remains the vital point
of proving the defendant killed the deceased and with malice, express
or implied. Theoretically, what scope a jury will give the word killed
depends on instructions about how much and what, as a matter of law
based on the evidence, they may attribute and impute to the defendant
for engaging in a felony of violence when the homicide occurred. A
charge to the jury, limited in terms, leaving them with the impression
that if they find the accused was perpetrating a felony when the homicide occurred responsibility attaches through application of the felony-murder doctrine, would equate to directing a verdict of guilt. For
if the only question left to the jury amounts to having it determine
whether there was a hold-up, the question of causation is ignored. In
this situation the jury would be finding malice, but not causation, and
4 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947).

5 362 Pa. 596, 68 A. 2d 595, 12 A.L.R. 2d 183 (1949).
6

374 Pa. 595, 98 A. 2d 733 (1953).

7

381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1955).

8 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955).

9 137 A. 2d 474 (Pa., 1958).
10 138 A. 2d 447 (Pa., 1958).
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when pressed further, if a jury is uninstructed on causation a verdict
of guilt amounts to punishing such defendants for their state of mind
alone, the malice being supplied solely by the independent felony. By
finding malice, without instructions on causation, simply means reaching a conclusion by conjecture. It is the difference between fastening
responsibility on an accused merely because a death follows his violent
act, and finding his responsibility because his act caused the death.
The felony-murder doctrine can easily supplant theories, and questions of causation, and bring about automatic responsibility for a
homicide merely by perpetrating a violent felony. A sounder view
would require, as suggested in substance by Jones, J., during his dissent to the Almeida majority, determining "if the homicidal act is connected with the initial maliciously motivated offense." On the other
hand, peremptory liability for any homicide can be attached to a defendant simply because he perpetrated a robbery, under the majority
reasoning reported in Almeida and Thomas.
But if the opposing views sponsored by Justice Jones when dissenting in Almeida are dissected, the theory of liability is clarified and
stripped of mechanical reasoning. His approach requires dividing the
problem into two parts: (1) causation; and (2) felony-murder. What
he puts forward as the basis for Almeida's liability can be restated in
the following fashion. An accused is not responsible for the death of
another unless the fatal harm was caused by the defendant's own act
or by those persons acting in concert with him. The resultant harm
can be imputed to the defendant only if it is the proximate consequence of his act; and it is also elementary that a person is presumed to
intend the natural, probable and reasonable consequences of his own
act. Inextricably woven into all this is the reasonable man's foreseeability of the consequences of his behavior. Accordingly, in a case
such as Almeida the question whether a "chain of events" existed continuously unbroken from the robbery to the death of Officer Ingling
is one of fact for the jury. Causation, then, fastens the result on the
defendant; but the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's finding of causation is a question of law. This means that there must be
substantial evidence from which the jury may properly draw their
inferences concerning the "chain of events"; absent such quantum of
evidence and their verdict rests on the shifting sands of speculation
and conjecture-that is, they convict simply because Almeida engaged
in a robbery and a person was killed. But given substantial evidence on

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

the issue of causation, and appropriate instructions, then the resultant
fatality might be imputed to the defendant; and under such proof
and reasoning the second phase consists of supplying malice through
application of the felony-murder doctrine. In other words, an evidentiary showing establishing causation does not, without more, indicate the malice requisite for murder. The result is imputed to the defendant and then, if appropriate, the felony-murder doctrine is the
fiction for supplying malice. Conceivably causation might lead to a
verdict of manslaughter if felony-murder is excluded or rejected by a
jury. But all of this requires recognition of the dangers lurking in
assuming causation flows automatically from the initial felony, and,
indeed, that is what happens when a trial judge indicates in his charge
to the jury that causation is present as a matter of law. If the foregoing reasoning is sound, the province of the jury has been invaded,
and in the last analysis a verdict of guilty has been virtually directed.
Jones, J., was urging that the Almeida jury should have been instructed to decide first whether the homicidal act was connected with
the felony or whether the chain of causation was broken and, if they
were satisfied on the issue underlying continuity they could then turn
to the felony-murder doctrine for the malice element.
It must, however, be constantly borne in mind that in some of
these Pennsylvania cases under consideration there are instances where
the killing was not actually committed by the felons or their accomplices. In the following fact situations the critical question is whether
a finding of murder is warranted solely by application of the felonymurder doctrine without a showing and adjudication, as Jones, J.,
puts the proposition, of causal connection between the perpetrators
of the felony and the homicide."
Commonwealth v. Moyer.-Moyer and Byron were jointly tried
for the murder of Zerbe and convicted by a jury which imposed the
death penalty. The judgments were affirmed.
Having mutually agreed to rob a filling station, Moyer and Byron
11 "Whether the acts of Almeida and his confederates were sufficient to constitute
the proximate cause of the killing was a question of law but whether they did constitute the proximate cause was a question of fact for the jury.... The jury should have
been instructed that, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder, it was not only
necessary for them to find the killing to have been coincidental with the perpetration
of a felony in which the defendant was at the time participating but that they would
also have to find that the fatal shot was fired by one of the felons, or, if not fired by one
of them, that the conduct of the defendant or his accomplices set in motion a chain of
events among whose reasonable foreseeable consequences was a killing such as actually
occurred." Jones, J., Com. v. Almeida, 362 Pa. at page 643, 68 A. 2d at page 618 (dissent).
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armed themselves, and in a car stolen for the purpose, drove to a gasoline station owned by Shank. When Zerbe, an employee-attendant
for Shank, approached the car Moyer got out and pressing an automatic against Zerbe ordered him to march toward the station where
Shank, momentarily unseen by Moyer, was standing. Upon noticing
Shank, Moyer immediately fired at him and missed him. Shank, who
had armed himself before the hold-up, fired five shots at Moyer.
Two bullets hit Moyer, who fired twice more at Shank while retreating to the car in which Byron waited. Nearing the car Moyer
fired again, as did Byron. Moyer's last shot was aimed at Shank, but
the Commonwealth contended that Moyer fired the bullet which
struck and killed Zerbe who was in the line of fire. Moyer and Byron
escaped from the scene.
Moyer was armed with a .32 caliber automatic pistol; Byron had
a .32 caliber revolver; and Shank was firing a .38 caliber revolver. A
.32 caliber bullet was found under Zerbe's body and a ballistics witness
testified this bullet could "only" have come from Moyer's automatic
pistol. The reviewing court stated that it was immaterial whether the
fatal shot was fired by Moyer or by Shank.
From the Bolish opinion comes this line: "[1ne of Shank's [the
station owner] shots accidentally struck and killed a gasoline attendant [Zerbe]." This, of course, fails to square with the factual account
stated by the Moyer court, and subsequent judicial comment in
Pennsylvania opinions underscores the immateriality of the point.
Yet Moyer is frequently cited as an instance of felony-murder in
which a killing resulted from a bullet fired by the hold-up victim
in self-defense. However, the significance of which weapon fired the
fatal shot seems to have attained importance later in Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Almeida.-A jury found Almeida guilty of first
degree murder, fixed the penalty at death, and on review this judgment was affirmed.
Almeida and two companions, Hough and Smith, all armed, robbed
a supermarket in Philadelphia. Almeida and Hough entered the market with drawn guns, emptied several cash registers; Almeida robbed
a customer, and fired a shot at the store manager. On leaving the
market, Almeida and Hough went to the automobile which Smith
was by then backing away from the curb. At this same time Ingling,
a police officer off duty, was returning to his automobile in which
his wife and children were sitting. Cries of "hold-up" brought police-
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men and two police cars to tile scene. When tile prowl car in which
police officers Waters and Fox were riding came abreast of the getaway car, Hough shot at the officers and Waters returned his fire.
Mrs. Ingling testified, in substance, that as Hough attempted to get
into the get-away automobile her husband grabbed Hough by the
back of the neck, Smith then fired three consecutive shots, the first
of which hit Officer Ingling. The Ingling children also testified that
Smith fired the fatal shot.
Prior to Almeida's trial, Hough' 2 pleaded guilty to the murder of
Ingling and was sentenced to die in the electric chair. At Almeida's
trial Hough testified that Almeida killed Ingling.
Smith was tried eleven days after Almeida, and was convicted of
first degree murder by a jury which set his penalty at life imprisonment.
During the course of its opinion reviewing Almeida's conviction
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noticed, in passing, that his counsel
pointed to certain facts which he urged as demonstrative of a strong
inference that the fatal shot was fired mistakenly by a policeman. But
it was not until a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that the grave question of whether deliberate suppression by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania of evidence of the fatal bullet
in a capital case was violative of due process. Pennsylvania appealed
from the lower federal court's grant of the writ and on appeal the
Third Circuit, affirming that judgment, brought out into the open
several significant facts.
Against the backdrop of that evidence, the extract being reprinted
in the marginal note for such purpose, tile impact of the testimony
given during Almeida's trial by Hough, Mrs. Ingling and her children is not only obvious but indicative of prosecution tactics. In
other words, although the trial judge instructed the jury that it matters not who fired the fatal shot, evidence pointing to Almeida had
been carefully adduced by the prosecutor. Indeed, Chief Judge
Biggs, speaking for the panel of judges in United States ex rel. Al12 Hough's conviction on his plea is reviewed in Com. v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247, 56 A. 2d
84 (1948): "[T~he killing was murder in the first degree. As to that, there is not the
slightest room for doubt. The homicide was a felonious killing with malice aforethought
and, therefore, murder; and the statute makes a murder committed in the perpetration
of, or attempting to perpetrate, a robbery murder in the first degree .. "
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meida v. Baldi,l3 held that the suppression of this evidence favorable
to Almeida was denial of due process:
In the court below as in this court the Commonwealth contended that the
question of who fired the fatal shot was irrelevant to the issue of whether
Almeida was or was not guilty of first degree murder, citing the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Almeida's case and in the Moyer case.
With this we agree. But the Commonwealth has never given any answer as to
why the evidence to which we have referred, suppressed as the court below
found it to have been, was not pertinent as to the issue of the penalty to be
imposed by the jury on Almeida. Putting it bluntly, there is no answer for it
195 F. 2d 815 (C.A. 3rd, 1952).
"The grant of the writ will not keep Almeida from being tried again for he cannot
successfully plead double jeopardy ... [cases collected]." Id. at 825.
Speaking of Almeida's motion for a new trial in the Pennsylvania Court of Oyer and
Terminer, the Third Circuit opinion notes: "At any rate the issue of deliberate suppression of evidence was not before the Court." Id. at 817.
"W¥e think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the instant case is
in conflict with our fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Id. at 820.
"There is no doubt that the police were armed with .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolvers. From the evidence at Almeida's trial it appears that Smith was armed with a
.22 caliber revolver, Hough with a .45 and Almeida "with a large pistol." It is also conceded that Almeida fired the only shot or shots which were fired within the supermarket.
"At Alneida's trial, the Commonwealth put a number of bullets in evidence but not
a .45 caliber bullet dug from between the roof and the ceiling of the market. This bullet
proved that Almeida was armed with a .45. Within a few minutes after Ingling had been
killed Ahrndt, a police detective, found on the pavement in front of the market and
about a dozen feet back of the place where Ingling's body had lain, a .38 caliber bullet
stained with blood. This bullet was not introduced in evidence.
"Smith was tried . . . after Almeida. Smith's counsel, in a way not clear from the
record, learned of the existence of the .38 caliber bullet and brought out many pertinent facts as to how Ingling had been killed. This evidence showed that Almeida was
armed with a .45 caliber 'horse' pistol. Hough with a .45 caliber automatic revolver,
and Smith with a .22; that Hough's .45 caliber automatic and Smith's .22 were recovered
by the police while Almeida's .45 caliber revolver was not recovered; that Almeida was
the only one of the robbers who fired inside the market and that a .45 caliber bullet
was found between the wall and the ceiling of the market. The evidence at Smith's trial
showed also that all the police officers (save perhaps Ingling, who was off duty) were
armed with .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolvers; that the .38 caliber bullet found
on the pavement in front of the market and back of the place where Ingling's body had
lain would fit the police revolvers; that a .45 caliber bullet is 11.4 millimeters in diameter
and that the diameter of the entering wound on Ingling's head was 10 millimeters as
measured by the Coroner's physician; that a .38 caliber bullet is 9.6 millimeters in diameter and would fit the entering wound in Ingling's head almost perfectly and that
while a bullet from Smith's .22 would have gone through the hole Smith's weapon had
not been fired. The evidence further disclosed, as we have stated, that the .38 caliber
bullet found on the pavement was bloodstained, and that Detective Harry Morris of the
Philadelphia Police Homicide Squad had taken a written statement from Officer Mark
McGinley that he had fired a shot outside the market and that a man had fallen to the
ground; that no other man fell." Id. at 816-17.
For the district court opinion see United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 104 F. Supp.
321 (D.C. Pa., 1951).
13
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is obvious that in weighing penalty the jury would have to consider whether
Almeida intended to kill Ingling.
There could be no avoidance of this issue and there was none. This is why
the Commonwealth endeavored to prove that Almeida or one of his confederates shot Ingling and why Almeida's counsel tried to show that Ingling came
to his death by a bullet fired by a member of the police force. Much of the trial
judge's charge was directed to this specific point and to the imposition of a
penalty by the jury. The jury might not have been impressed by the suppressed
evidence and could still have imposed the death penalty on Almeida but it cannot
be assumed that the jury would have done so. 14

It should also be borne in mind that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Almeida on a record devoid of the evidentiary material relied on in the Third Circuit opinion. Indeed, in their subsequent opinions analyzing Almeida, and discussed later in this paper,
the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals is unmentioned.
Commonwealth v. Lowry.-On appeal Lowry's conviction of first
degree murder was affirmed.
On an evening in May 1950, Chapasco and Pearson went to a food
market for the purpose of committing a robbery. While lurking
behind a building they were discovered. They then seized the owner
and two employees of the market, lined them up along a wall of the
building, struck and knocked them to the ground. Pearson shot and
killed Sklar while he was lying on the ground; Chapasco misfired
and dropped his gun. They ran from the scene to the front of the
building, jumped into Chapasco's car, which was driven by Lowry
who lived in and was familiar with the neighborhood where the
market was located. Lowry drove them, with lights out, rapidly away
toward Philadelphia. Prior to the hold-up, the defendant had been
seen frequently in the vicinity of the market.
Commonwealth v. Bolish (No. 1).-Convicted of murder in the
first degree by a jury which fixed the penalty at death, Bolish appealed. The judgment was reversed and a new trial awarded.
One Flynn died as the result of burns received in a flash fire and
explosion, in an empty house, which he ignited in pursuance of a
plan to commit arson probably entered into with Bolish. Circumstantial evidence indicated the involvement of Bolish with Flynn in
a plot to burn the house, in which Flynn was burned, to defraud an
insurance company. Bolish was prosecuted on the theory he was the
instigator of Flynn, and accordingly responsible for his death under
the felony-murder doctrine.
14

195 F. 2d 815, 819-20 (C.A. 3rd, 1952).
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Commonwealth v. Bolish (No. 2).-On retrial Bolish was again
convicted of murder in the first degree and this time the jury set his
penalty at life imprisonment. From the evidentiary aspects in this
second opinion it appeared that Flynn was possibly burned when
he placed a glass jar, containing volatile substance on a live electric
hot plate located in one of the rooms of the subject house. "There
was no direct evidence ... [Bolish], by his own hand committed the
arson which resulted in the death of his accomplice. There was ...
direct and circumstantial evidence showing the presence of Bolish
in the . . . house . . . at the time of the explosion." But Musmanno,
J., in his dissent insisted "no evidence whatsoever remotely substantiates such an assertion." In any event the majority affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Thomas.-This was an appeal by the Commonwealth from the trial court's ruling sustaining defendant's demurrer
to the prosecution's evidence at the Thomas murder trial. Reversed
and new trial ordered.
Thomas and Jackson, the deceased, entered the grocery store of
Cecchini and ordered him to open the cash drawer. Jackson pointed
his revolver at Cecchini. Thomas took some money, and he and
Jackson ran from the store-Jackson running one way and Thomas
the other. Cecchini secured his own pistol and chased Jackson, and
in the exchange of shots Cecchini killed Jackson.
When the Thomas case reached the trial court, on remand, the
district attorney moved for leave to nolle prosequi the murder and
manslaughter indictments and such disposition 15 was made of each
charge with the approval of the trial judge. With Thomas saved
from further risk of the death penalty, the Pennsylvania Court could,
and expressly did, overrule the Thomas decision, without any qualms,
for the reason that it currently thought Thomas was "an unwarranted
judicial extension of the felony-murder rule." Of course, reaching a
reversal in Redline's appeal drove the Court to upset their Thomas
opinion, decided roughly two and one-half years earlier, because that
decision rested uneasily on automatic guilt by association. For malice,
the Thomas majority had used the underlying robbery, mentioned a
little about liability flowing from conspiracy, quoted from Almeida,
Moyer, Bolish, and concluded, inter alia:
15 This disposition was noted by the redline majority and by Musmanno, J., in his
dissent to the second bolish majority opinion.
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That the victim, or any third person such as an officer, would attempt to prevent the robbery or to prevent the escape of the felons, and would shoot and
kill one of the felons was "as readily foreseeable" as the cases where an innocent
bystander is killed, even unintentionally, by the defendant's accomplice, or where
the victim of the robbery is slain, or where a pursuing officer is killed. The killing of the co-felon is the natural foreseeable result of the initial act. The robbery
was the proximate cause of the death. We can see no sound reason for distinction merely because the one killed was a co-felon. It was a killing in the perpetration of a robbery which was "unquestionably contemplated and callously
ignored by the defendant, who most certainly intended to commit a crime which
he knew might well give rise to it."

Comnonwealth v. Redline.-Found guilty of murder in the first
degree, Redline moved for a motion in arrest of judgment and a new
trial, both of which motions were discharged [overruled] by the
lower Court. On appeal judgment of sentence was reversed and the
cause remanded with instructions to reinstate and grant the motion
in arrest of judgment.
Redline was indicted and tried for the murder of Worseck committed in the perpetration of robbery. The evidence produced by
the Commonwealth showed that the defendant together with Worseck perpetrated robbery at gun point upon certain persons in a
restaurant. During the course of the robbery two police officers were
disarmed and held captive in the establishment. Upon leaving the
scene of the robbery the defendant and his accomplice, Worseck,
compelled one Hershman to accompany them. Redline was the first
to leave the building, behind him was Hershman and behind Hershman was Worseck. As they were leaving, uniformed police officers
were approaching the premises. When Redline observed one of them,
Sergeant Palm, he shouted to him, "The man you want is in there."
With that Redline pointed a .45 caliber gun at the police officer and
fired. At the time Redline fired he was approximately 15 to 20 feet
from Sergeant Palm. There had been no shooting whatever prior to
his shot. Sergeant Palm returned the defendant's fire and a gun battle
ensued. Several police officers, Redline and Worseck were involved.
During the gun play two officers were seriously wounded. Redline
was wounded as was Worseck. Worseck's wound, inflicted by a
policeman's bullet, proved fatal.
Comnonwealth v. Moyer was resolved by application of principles
underlying the doctrine of proximate cause laid down in three early
civil cases, with special emphasis falling on the "Squib Case."1 In
10 Scott v. Sheppart, 2 William Blackstone's Rep. 892, See also Holmes, Common Law

103-104 (43d printing 1949).
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short, it was held that the Moyer-Byron felonious invasion of Shank's
business place was the proximate cause of the resulting fatality.
Nothing whatever is mentioned in the opinion concerning the victim's status as a felon or non-felon; this aspect emerges in Redline.
In several places in the Moyer opinion that Court underscores its
position on the question of who fired the fatal bullet as immaterial to
the decision point, and on another phase concludes:
It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when
a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events
which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was
initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost
inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act. For any individual forcibly to defend himself or his family or his property from criminal aggression is a
primal human instinct. It is the right and duty of both individuals and nations
to meet criminal aggression with effective countermeasures. Every robber or
burglar knows when he attempts to commit his crime that he is inviting dangerous resistance. Any robber or burglar who carries deadly weapons (as most
of them do and as these robbers did) thereby reveals that he expects to meet
and overcome forcible opposition.

To be sure there are statements in the Moyer opinion regarding
evidence 17 indicating that Zerbe was shot in the back, and that the
bullet under his body was one fired from an automatic pistol, yet
again this opinion states: "If in fact one of the bullets fired by Shank
in self-defense killed Zerbe, the responsibility for killing rests on
Moyer and his co-conspirator Byron ... ." Elsewhere this Court flatly
stated:
Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events
he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against him on the part of the
selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of
retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible.

Moyer is the base case threaded through all the opinions under
examination, and remained unchallenged and unimpaired until Redline. Obviously, Moyer presented a judicial stumbling block, especially since the Almeida court, after expressly stating Moyer-Byron
was authority for the decision it was then making, continued by
explaining:
Our decision in the Moyer-Byron case was an application of the long established principle that he whose felonious act is the proximate cause of another's
death is criminally responsible for that death and must answer to society for it
17 Compare this instruction: "[I]f you would be of the opinion under all of the evidence in this case that it was an accidental killing of Zerbe by Shank, it is possible that
these defendants may not be found guilty of murder in the first degree, or may not be
found guilty at all.... Com. v. Moyer, 357 Pa. at page 187, 53 A. 2d at page 740.
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cxactly as hc who is negligently the proximate cause of another's death is civilly
responsible for that death and must answer in damages for it.

That inconvenient passage was seized upon by the Redline majority, as though nothing else had been said in Almeida concerning
proximate cause. In Redline the majority thought the Almeida rationale stemmed from adapting proximate cause to the common law
requirement of felony causation for application of the felony-murder
rule,'8 and about which they said:
[T]he "causation" requirement for responsibility in a felony-murder is that
the homicide stem from the commission of the felony. Obviously, the assumed
analogy between that concept and the tort-liability requirement of proximate
cause is not conclusive. If it were, then the doctrine of supervening cause, which,
for centuries, courts have recognized and rendered operative on questions of
proximate cause, would have to be considered and passed upon by the jury. But
that qualification, the Almeida case entirely disregarded.
... [T]he decision in the Moyer and Byron case was in no sense authority for
the ruling in Almeida. And, the same can be said for the decisions in Commonwealth v. Guida, Commonwealth v. Doris, Commonwealth v. Sterling. In each
of these °cases the death dealing act was committed by one participating in the
initial felony.

Several matters require immediate attention despite considerations
of sequence. It must be remembered that Almeida was not overruled
in Redline, but delimited through this chimerical approach:
In short, the Almeida case was concerned with the killing, during the perpetration of a felony, of an innocent and law-abiding person by someone other
than the felons or ones acting in aid of their criminal conspiracy. The evidence
warranted a finding that it was an accidental killing by an officer of the law,
but the felons were held accountable nonetheless on the basis of proximate
causation regardless of who fired the fatal shot. In the present instance, the victim of the homicide was one of the robbers who, while resisting apprehension
in his effort to escape, was shot and killed by a policeman in the performance of
his duty. Thus, the homicide was justifiable and, obviously, could not be availed
of, on any rational legal theory, to support a charge of murder. How can anyone,
no matter how much of an outlaw he may be, have a criminal charge lodged
against him for the consequences of the lawful conduct of another person? The
mere statement of the question carries with it its own answer.
It is, of course, true that the distinction thus drawn between Alneida and the
instant case on the basis of the difference in the character of the victims of the
homicide is more incidental than legally significant so far as relevancy to the
felony-murder rule is concerned ....

In other words, if a felon can be held for

murder for a killing occurring during the course of a felony, even though the
death was not inflicted by one of the felons but by someone acting in hostility
to them, it should make no difference to the crime of murder who the victim
of the homicide happened to be. However, the factual difference, so noted,
admits of a recognizable distinction with respect to a felon's responsibility for an
18

Kenny, Outrlines of Criminal Law 126-131 (Turner Ed. 1952).
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incidental killing (which another has committed), depending upon whether the
homicide was justifiable or excusable, and such distinction serves the useful purpose of thwarting further extension of the rule enunciated in Commonwealth
v. Almeida that it is immaterial who fires the fatal shot so long as the accused
was engaged in a felony.
The limitation which we thus place on the decision in the Alneida case renders unnecessary any present reconsideration of the extended holding in that
case. It will be time enough for action in such regard if and when a conviction
for murder based on facts similar to those presented by the Almeida case (both
as to the performer of the lethal act and the status of its victim) should again

come before this court.

A check for logical consistency in those quoted passages is doomed
to failure from the outset. The constriction of Almeida and the
reversal of Redline exhibit some influence of the phrase "unlawful
killing of another" embedded in the common law definition of murder. The Redline majority back into their solution by starting with
TABLE 1
JUDICIAL EVALUATION OF FATAL SHOOTING
Person
Killed

Stage of Defendant's
Behavior When Fatal
Action Occurred

Moyer"5 .....

Non-felon

Perpetrating robbery

Almeida ..
Lowry .......
Thomas ...

Non-felon
Non-felon
Co-felon

Redline ......

Co-felon

Decision

Person
Firing Fatal
Bullet

Victim of
robbery (?)
Escaping
Police officer
Perpetrating robbery JCo-felon
Escaping
IVictim of
robbery
Escaping
Police officer

Classification of
Fatal Act

Homicide
Category
per Case

Justifiable 20

Murder

Excusable
Felonious
Felonious

Murder
Murder
Murder

Justifiable

19Almeida, Moyer and Bolish are relied upon in Peo. v. Wilburn, 314 P. 2d 290,
295 (Calif., 1957) where the Court said: "There may be some good reasons for the
divergence of views and opinions as to the theoretical approach in the 'felony-murder
rule,' one set of decisions following the 'proximate cause' theory, and another the 'furtherance of the felony' doctrine, and still others not following any rule at all, but in any
event it would appear certain that courts should not belabor themselves in too fine distinctions in terms and otherwise which results in the protection of armed robbers, who
by their course of conduct with malice, start and continue with actions which ultimately result in the violent death may be imposed upon the armed robber, and of innocent victims."
20 The classification is found in the majority opinion of the Redline case.
This is a convenient juncture to collect some recent cases relying on the Pennsylvania
opinions considered in text: Stockley v. State, 254 Ala. 534, 49 S. 2d 284 (1950); Hornbeck v. State, 77 S. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955); State v. Owen, 253 P. 2d 203 (Idaho 1953); People
v. Podolski, 52 N.W. 2d 201 (Mich. 1952); State v. Schaud, 44 N.W. 2d 61 (Minn.
1950); State v. Fouquette, 221 P. 2d 404 (Nev. 1950); Hinrichs v. First Judicial District
Court, 283 P. 2d 614 (Nev. 1955); Coin. v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 59 A. 2d 53 (1948);
Com. v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A. 2d 353 (1949); Com. v. Zietz, 364 Pa. 294, 72 A. 2d
282 (1950); Com. v. Phillips, 372 Pa. 223, 93 A. 2d 455 (1953).
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the lawful act of the police officer in shooting Redline's co-felon
and, then reasoning substantially along the line that this justifiable
homicide fails in supporting Redline's conviction because: (1) it is
a superseding defensive act breaking the chain of causation and (2)
malice cannot be imputed from that lawful act. Such reasoning obviously must begin at the point when Redline committed a felonious
assault by shooting at that officer who was standing 15 feet away
from Redline when Redline was fleeing the robbery scene. It is unclear whether the majority envisage felony-murder as indicative of
an accused person's intent to kill or whether responsibility is imputed
to an accused without troubling about establishing an intent to kill.
All of the Pennsylvania cases manifest varying applications of tort
theories of liability in patterns of foreseeability of proximate cause.
Excluding Bolish, they may be recapitulated as shown in Table 1.
The majority opinion in Almeida is bottomed on words familiarly
used when discussing causation.2 1 To the Almeida court MoyerByron contained the identical fact issue, yet in Redline the majority
insist Moyer-Byron was "inno sense authority for the ruling in
Almeida." Almeida, whatever is said about it, underscores the fact
that the shooting by the police officers was a normal response to the
22
stimulus of the situation created by the felons. People v. Garippo
and Commonwealth v. Campbell were treated by the majority as
inapposite in Almeida only to later appear as authority for the Redline majority.
Thomas, now abandoned, epitomized an accused person's vulnerability to suffer the death penalty because the mental element present
21 "In his charge the trial judge said: 'If that [fatal] shot were fired by anyone, even
anyone removed from these three participants, and that shot was fired in the perpetration of a robbery, members of the jury, that is murder; that is murder in the first
degree.... If one or more persons set in motion a chain of circumstances out of which
death ensues, those persons must be held responsible for any death which by direct, by
almost inevitable sequence, results from such unusual criminal act.... So, if the death
of Officer Ingling was the inevitable consequence of the unlawful act, or acts, of the
defendant, or the continuation of the unlawful act, or acts, of the defendant, acting in
concert-for every one who does an unlawful act is considered by the law as the doer
of all that follows-if that act is a killing, members of the jury, that killing is murder.'"
Com. v. Almeida, 362 Pa. at page 601, 68 A. 2d at page 598.
22 Professor Beale correctly pointed out that Com. v. Campbell, 7 All. (Mass.) 541
(1863) was not in banc, but at the trial of a case. "The decision," he said, "has unfortunately been followed," citing Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Com.v.
Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905), all of which are invoked by the majority in
Com. v. Redline. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633,
649 (1920). But compare The English Homicide Act of 1957, in Appendix B to this
paper.
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in his intentional act of robbery apparently satisfied the requirement
of malice; malice was imputed to Thomas because of his contemporaneous participation in the felony of robbery; a result attained by
unduly pressing the doctrine of constructive malice. It should be
noted in passing that during the Thomas trial counsel stipulated that
no bullet from the defendant's gun touched his accomplice, and admitted that the fatal wound was inflicted by a bullet from the storekeeper-robbery-victim's weapon. 3 Yet the Thomas majority went
on to say:
The felon's robbery set in motion a chain of events which were or should have
been within his [Thomas'] contemplation when the motion was initiated. He
therefore should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost
inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.

That is a wide net of causation to cast over an accused if the theorem
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea retains any vitality.
Thomas and Almeida were heavily, and understandably, relied upon by the Commonwealth in the Redline appeal 4 pivoting as it did
on the defense contention that there could be no criminal responsibility for Redline's accomplice's death since it was a justifiable homicide by a policeman who fired the fatal shot in the line of official duty.
That such reliance was unavoidably misplaced was quickly dispelled
by a determined and sharply divided court. Possibly haunted by the
suppressed bullet episode lurking in Almeida's conviction, the Red23 Dissenting to the Redline majority, Justice Bell recalled: "The specific reason
or ground for the present majority opinion-a justifiable homicide-was vigorously
urged but was competely and unequivocally rejected by this Court in Commonwealth
v. Thomas. It was thus clearly expressed by the writer [Jones, J.1 of the present majority
opinion in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Thomas.... ." Com. v. Redline,
137 A. 2d at page 498.
24 Issue presented in Brief filed on Redline's behalf: "Can a defendant be guilty of
murder where his co-felon was justifiably killed by a police officer at the scene of a
robbery?" Brief for Appellant, p. 1, Com. v. Redline, 137 A. 2d 474 (Pa., 1958).
As the point was raised by the Commonwealth in Redline's appeal: "When policemen who are feloniously shot at by robbers return their fire in self-defense and one of
the robbers is killed by a shot fired by the defenders is the robber whose felonious
action, in firing the first shot directly at a policeman, caused the shooting, guilty of
murder?" Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Com. v. Redline, supra.
The Almeida court framed the question, then before them: "[W]hen men who are
feloniously shot at by robbers return their fire in self-defense and a third person is killed
by a shot fired by the defenders, are the robbers whose felonious action caused the
shooting guilty of murder?" Com. v. Almeida, 362 Pa. at page 603, 68 A. 2d at page 599.
Question by Thomas court: "[C]an a co-felon be found guilty of murder where
the victim of an armed robbery justifiably kills the other felon as they flee from the
scene of the crime?" Com. v. Thomas, 382 Pa. at page 641,117 A. 2d at page 204.
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line majority diluted the impact of that opinion observing, among
other things, that "it was a radical departure from common law criminal jurisprudence; and the ruling should not be extended by still
further judicial enlargement." Thomas, on the other hand, was expressly repudiated.
Far from envisaging any disturbance of prevailing Pennsylvania
case law, the Redline majority claim their attitude restores order for
they thought if felons are to be responsible for all deaths "occurring
in and about the perpetration of their felonies-regardless of how or
by whom such fatalities came" that was a matter for the legislature.
Just why Thomas was treated judicially rather than with felicity
toward the legislative branch of government is, perhaps wisely, left
undiscussed.
To put together indications, reflected in the Redline majority opinion, of the basis for it, is a task for which there are a few examples
but no principles; there is wanting any firm logical structure. There
are, to be sure, fragments of familiar themes which soften rather than
sharpen the more they are read for this opinion is at its best an announcement of policy rather than a completely legalistic solution of
controverted issues. It is a solution of the appeal not of the problem.
The content eludes analysis; it is not the type of meaningful content
that withstands even congenial appraisal. What has been done is to
implement the majority opinion with the buttress of allusion to, and
argumentative shuttling back and forth between common law and
statute. Beginning with common law for the premise that an accidental or unintentional homicide committed in perpetration, or during an attempted perpetration, of felony is murder, the argument
picks up malice as an indispensable element of that offense and shows
how it is supplied, or applied, by the independent felony 20 legally
25 In Redline the trial judge instructed the jury inter alia: "For your information
so that you will understand the whole sequence of what murder is under the statute,
as well as the common law, I have defined first degree, told you what that is under the
Act, and as the Act said, all other murder is murder of the second degree. Murder of
the second degree consists of an unlawful killing with malice but without a deliberate
intent to kill. However, in this case counsel have stipulated of record that insofar as this
case is concerned, it being charged that this murder took place during the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate a felony; namely, robbery, that this defendant is either guilty
of first degree murder or not guilty; that the other provision of the murder statute so
far as second degree murder is not applicable. That has been agreed and stipulated by

counsel in this case, so I will say no more about second degree murder." Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Com. v. Redline, 137 A. 2d 474 (Pa., 1958).
26 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen when charging the jury in Reg. v. Sern6, 16 Cox C.C.
311 (1887) expressed this position: "In my opinion the definition of the law which
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linked with the homicide. In any event the Pennsylvania Court emphasizes that in felony-murder it is the malice which is imputed and
not the act of killing, the malice from the initial offense attaching to
whatever else an accused person may do. But mere coincidence of
felony and homicide, is insufficient for invocation of the felonymurder doctrine. Not all homicides occurring in the perpetration of
felonies are classed as first degree murder, or, stated another way, the
Pennsylvania degree statute expressly restricts all felony-murder other
than homicides committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, robbery,
burglary or kidnapping to murder in the second degree. From this
line of reasoning the Court concludes, as though it had been contested:
Logically, therefore, the basic determination of the fact of murder is to be

made according to the rules of the common law, including the felony-murder
theory of imputed malice, and, upon a finding of guilt, the degree statute automatically raises the murder to first degree if it happened, inter alia, to have
been committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kid-

napping....

Redline, manifesting as it does judicial reluctance to approve automatic liability through application of the felony-murder doctrine for
any killing whatever cropping up in the course or furtherance of a
violent felony, bears some affinity for the attitudes toward limiting
or modifying liability to suffer the death penalty for murder reported
by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, convened during
1949-1953, and Parliament's effort, based on adjustments of conflicting interests, to articulate some of the Commission's views 27 through

the 1957 English Homicide Act. The sponsors of the Bill underlying
the Act intended to retain the death penalty, but sought some limitation on behavior patterns making an acused vulnerable to capital
punishment. What homicides should amount to the "supreme" crime
of murder comprised the working formula used in drafting the Act.
English law was changed by taking some homicides out of the murder
makes it murder to kill by an act done in the commission of a felony might and ought
to be narrowed.... I think that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to say
that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death, done for
the purpose of committing a felony which caused death, should be murder...."
27 Report, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd. 8932, at 36-45 (1953). See
Wingersky, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953):
A Review, 44 J. C. L., Crim. and P. S. 695, 701-703 (1954).
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category, and, also, by eliminating the death penalty for some homicides categorized as murder under the Act.
The Act is divided into five major parts, portions of which are
reprinted in Appendix B. Part I amends the English law as "to the
fact of murder." Liability to the death penalty is provided for in
Part II. Part III contains amendments as to the form and execution
of the death sentence in England and Wales, and the effective date
and short title are set out in Part V.
By mandating the requirement of malice aforethought (despite
absence of meaningful content for that phrase), section 1.-(1) and
(2) eliminates common law constructive malice. Malice 21 will no
longer be supplied merely because the homicide occurred in the
course or furtherance of another offense. Clause 1, in its current
form, is of little aid in solving legal problems involving the quality
of the unlawful act, i.e., whether restricted to felonies of violence.
Resisting lawful arrest had been consistently singled out for particular
attention 29 by English common law for applications of constructive
malice, and apparently clause 2 is intended to avoid any judicial
exclusion of such cases from the purposes of clause 1.
Section 5 is a legislative attempt at grading murder through the
device of specifying with particularity what homicides constitute
capital murders, coupled with restricted retention of the death penalty. Of interest here, against the backdrop of the Pennsylvania cases
sketched out above, are the provisions of §§ 1.-(1), 5.-(1) (a), (c),
(d), 5.-(4) and 5.-(5) (g). Yet at the same time the undue vagueness permeating the English Act must be taken into account. "Theft"
and "stealing" are sweeping terms and could complicate homicide
cases arising in connection with petty theft, though constructive
malice is abolished through § 1.
Section 5.-2 was probably drafted in the hope of restricting liability for the death penalty to only common law principals in the
first degree-the actual perpetrator of the fatal blow-and for the
2s "Malice in its legal sense exists not only where there is a particular ill will, but also
when ever there is a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty. Legal malice
may be inferred and found from the attending circumstances....
"If there was an unlawful killing with (legal) malice, express or implied, that will
constitute murder even though there was no intent to injury or kill the particular person who was killed and even though his death was unintentional or accidental." Com. v.
Bolish, 381 Pa. at page 510, 113 A. 2d at page 471.
29

Cmd. No. 8932 at 29 and 445 (1953).
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purposes of excluding from liability to suffer the death penalty those
who remain absent from the scene of perpetration, for example, accessories before the fact and co-conspirators. However, the test of
foreseeability remains intact and certainly it would be capital murder
where A intends the death of X and incites and procures B to kill X
in A's absence. The Act has not abrogated all common law theories
of liability.
Pennsylvania's first degree provision, containing the word "murder" averts the odd result reached through expressly listing the
means of taking life in the English Act, for as members in the House
of Commons! declared,30 during the debates on the Bill, if a man shoots
his wife he will hang, if he kills her by slow poison he will be imprisoned; if an accused stabs a fireman he will not hang, but he will
for stabbing a policeman.
Section 5.- (2) apparently restricts imposition of the death penalty
to common law principals in the first degree-the person kills with
his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or innocent human agent.
Common law principals in the second degree are, it would seem, intended as excluded from capital murder, especially if they are only
constructively present. Even if viewed in the modern American approach that all participating at the scene are principals, section 5.-(2)
requires, for capital murder, a showing of particularly described behavior on the part of the accused. As this section reads that if there
are two felons, a murder by one will not be readily nor automatically
be imputed to the other, unless there is sufficient evidentiary showing
of malice in each of them, and it must be remembered, constructive
malice has been abolished in England.
When the Pennsylvania degree statute (Appendix A) is compared
with the Homicide Act of 1957 it is obvious that in England the
death penalty is not imposed for all behavior that is first degree murder in Pennsylvania. What chiefly emerges is the fact that the English
Act abolishes the death penalty for murder in all situations except
those expressly enumerated in section 5, which omits mention of
arson, rape,3 1 or kidnapping, as does the Pennsylvania statute. In the
latter statute, when referring to such felonies, the phrase used is "in
the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate," and in the English
30 64 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 454 (5th Series, 1957).
31 Cf. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, House of Lords, 1920, App. Cas. 479,
12 A.L.R. 846 (1920).
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Act it is "in the course or furtherance of." Neither Act defines the
scope or meaning of that phraseology, leaving the familiar questions
as elusive as before.
If Bolish were tried under the English Act its exclusion of constructive malice and the omission of arson [unless a contention prevailed that he "caused" an explosion within the meaning of S 5.-(1)
(b)] it might be argued, he was not subject to the death penalty.
If tried or reviewed under the English Act, all the other Pennsylvania
cases would, it appears, have to be decided without application of the
felony-murder doctrine.
The Homicide Act of 1957 leaves much to be desired in the way
of clarity, draftsmanship, and content, yet it reflects a significant
move toward updating some antiquated and unrealistic notions and
grounds supporting conviction leading to the death penalty, bringing
them more in line with ethical thinking.
Perhaps Fisher v. United States supra, influenced the drafters of
this Act, for diminished responsibility is approved as an operative
fact for reducing murder to manslaughter. Similarly provocation, as
a mitigating factor in reducing murder to manslaughter, is enlarged
by providing for provocation by words. Section 4 alters the responsibility of survivors of suicide pacts.
A murder trial resembles a game played with human pieces, offering pleasant excitement since no one involved risks his life except
the accused. Eventually, the game ends by strangulating or electrocuting the "bad" man. Love for fellow men runs subjectively; it can
neither be objectified nor legislated into existence; but this does not
constitute the warrant for dehumanizing law. State approval and
enforcement of the death penalty quickly replaces personal ethics
with sterile impersonal ethics of society.
Despite euphemistic wording executions carried out under and
pursuant to law are killings of human beings. Justifiable homicide is
a more pleasant term, suggesting an absence of any responsibility by
the individual members of the community. Community self-defense,
on the other hand, is connected with the death penalty by the belief
it prevents murders. Each reason offered in support of capital punishment must be separately examined in order to ascertain whether or
not it is valid. Many of such reasons, or opinions, lost ground during
the study made by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.
Certainly some of the Pennsylvania cases, mentioned in this article,
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show the relative guilt vulnerable to absolute punishment. The pattern of those decisions varied with the changing membership of the
Court (see Appendix C) and quite possibly, Redline is admittedly
the end-product of judicial legislation. There is a singular coincidence
between the tolerant views of the Redline Court and the adoption of
the English Homicide Act.
A reading of the Pennsylvania cases and the examination of the
Homicide Act of 1957 should persuade one of the uncertainty permeating the homicide area in criminal law. The death penalty cannot be viewed in isolation, or merely as another criminal sanction.
This irrevocable (part of the reason it transcends the legal framework) penalty must call forth s6mething more in its support than
legal authority to punish, bottomed on unproved claims of deterrence3 2 and notions of community self-defense. Without reliable
usable statistics 38 demonstrating the deterrent value of the death penalty, the arguments of protagonists rest upon speculation, conjecture,
and wishful thinking. Utilitarian theories sheltering the death penalty,
while more economical for taxpayers supporting prisoners incarcerated for life, are shocking when put in the proper setting. Killing a
convicted murderer, under court order, as a deterrent and example to
other persons, makes use of the condemned person as a means.
"Coddling criminals" is the common-place automatic response triggered by even casual mention of abolishing capital punishment. That
two word blockade of ideas is repeatedly implemented by conglomerate illustrations of rapists, war, and self-defense. Mentally fingerpainting pictures of such punishment abolished invariably blurs the
jagged edges of the death penalty, leaving the desired uneasy impression that some how all convicted murderers will run unpunished as
massacres of the population become imminent. Stale polemics urged,
always vigorously, by protagonists of the death penalty all too fre3

2 Testimony of Professor C. W. Topping, 5 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
123-149, (1955) Joint Committee, Senate and House of Commons of Canada, 2nd Sess.,
22nd Parl., on Capital and Corporal Punishment and Lotteries. See also 6 Minutes of
Proceedings and Evidence 161-184 (1955).
Appendix, Brief No. 1, Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 12 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 397-402 (1955).
aa See e.g., Testimony and prepared statement of Professor Thorsten Sellin, Joint
Committee of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada on Capital and Corporal
Punishment and Lotteries, 1st Sess., 22nd Par]., 17 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
661-743 (1954); Appendix F, Part I, Sellin, Findings of U.S.A. Surveys on the Death
Penalty and Police Safety, Part II, Campion, S.J., The State Police and The Death
Penalty, 20 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence 718-741 (1955).
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quently betrays a terrible urge for vengeance and a vague notion of

the duty to punish with death. Blood vengeance rooted in ancient
instincts, only partially sublimated by the shift of force to the state,
is regularized through criminal law which, also provides excitement
for the general population.
Criminal law reaches men from the outside and any collision with
subjective attitudes is quickly overridden by social pressures; individual conscience is appeased by the anonymity of the executioner and
the remote location where he kills the condemned man.
APPENDIX A
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE

Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated (1945),.Title 18, Chapter 2

5 4701. Murder of the first and second degree:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait,
or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which
shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree. All
other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree. The jury before
whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such
person guilty thereof, ascertain in their verdict whether the person is guilty of
murder of the first or second degree. If such person is convicted by confession,
the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of
the crime, and to give sentence accordingly.
Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the first degree is guilty of a
felony and shall be sentenced to suffer death in the manner provided by law,
or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the
case, which shall fix the penalty by its verdict. The court shall impose the sentence so fixed, as in other cases. In cases of pleas of guilty, the court, where it
determines the crime to be murder of the first degree, shall, at its discretion,
impose sentence of death or imprisonment for life. The clerk of the court
wherein such conviction takes place shall, within ten (10) days after such sentence of death, transmit a full and complete record of the trial and conviction
to the Governor.
Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the second degree is guilty
of a felony, and shall, for the first offense, be sentenced to undergo imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement not exceeding twenty (20) years, or
fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or both, and for the second offense,
shall undergo imprisonment for the period of his natural life. ...
1 4710. Assault with intent to kill:
Whoever administers, or causes to be administered by another, any poison or
other destructive thing or stabs, cuts or wounds any person, or by any means
causes any person bodily injury, dangerous to life, with intention to commit
murder, is guilty of felony, and shall on conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
not exceeding three thousand dollars ($3,000), or undergo imprisonment, by
separate or solitary confinement at labor, not exceeding seven (7) years, or both.
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APPENDIX 13
THE ENGLISH HOMICIDE ACT
HOMICIDE ACT,

1957, 5 & 6

ELIZABETH

2,

CHAPTER 11

CHAPTER 11

An Act to make for England and Wales (and for courts-martial wherever sitting)
amendments of the law relating to homicide and the trial and punishment of
murder, and for Scotland amendments of the law relating to the trial and
punishment of murder and attempts to murder.
[21st March, 1957]
Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice
and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:PART I. AMENDMENTS OF LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES AS TO FACT OF MURDER

1.(1) Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other
offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice
aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another offence.
(2) For the purposes of the foregoing subsection, a killing done in the course
or for the purpose of resisting an officer of jusitce, or of resisting or avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or rescue from
legal custody, shall be treated as a killing in the course or furtherance of an
offence.
2.-(1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not
be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind
(whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind
or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired
his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to
the killing.
(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person
charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder.
(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal
or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted
of manslaughter.
(4) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable
to be convicted of murder shall not affect the question whether the killing
amounted to murder in the case of any other party to it.
3. Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find
that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things
said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the
provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left
to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall
take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which,
in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man.
4.-(1) It shall be manslaughter, and shall not be murder, for a person acting
in pursuance of a suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be
a party to the other killing himself or being killed by a third person.
(2) Where it is shown that a person charged with the murder of another
killed the other or was a party to his killing himself or being killed, it shall be
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for the defence to prove that the person charged was acting in pursuance of a
suicide pact between him and the other.
(3) For the purposes of this section "suicide pact" means a common agreement between two or more persons having for its object the death of all of
them, whether or not each is to take his own life, but nothing done by a person
who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as done by him in pursuance of
the pact unless it is done while he has the settled intention of dying in pursuance
of the pact.
PART II. LIABILITY TO DEATH PENALTY

5.-(l) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, the following murders shall
be capital murders, that is to say,(a) any murder done in the course or furtherance of theft;
(b) any murder by shooting or by causing an explosion;
(c) any murder done in the course or for the purpose of resisting or avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest, or of effecting or assisting an escape or
rescue from legal custody;
(d) any murder of a police officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a
person assisting a police officer so acting;
(e) in the case of a person who was a prisoner at the time when he did or was
a party to the murder, any murder of a prison officer acting in the execution of his duty or of a person assisting a prison officer so acting.
(2) If, in the case of any murder falling within the foregoing subsection, two
or more persons are guilty of the murder, it shall be capital murder in the case
of any of them who by his own act caused the death of, or inflicted or attempted
to inflict grievous bodily harm on, the person murdered, or who himself used
force on that person in the course of furtherance of an attack on him; but the
murder shall not be capital murder in the case of any other of the persons
guilty of it.
(3) Where it is alleged that a person accused of murder is guilty of capital
murder, the offence shall be charged as capital murder in the indictment, and
if a person charged with capital murder is convicted thereof, he shall be liable
to the same punishment for the murder as heretofore.
(4) In this Act "capital murder" means capital murder within subsection (1)
and (2) of this section.
(5) In this section(a) "police officer" means a constable who is a member of a police force or a
special constable appointed under any Act of Parliament, and "police
force" has the same meaning as in section thirty of the Police Pensions
Act, 1921 (as amended by the Police Act, 1946) or, as regards Scotland,
the same meaning as in section forty of the Police (Scotland) Act, 1956;
(b) "prison" means any institution for which rules may be made under the
Prison Act, 1952, or the Prisons (Scotland) Act, 1952, and any establishment under the control of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State where
persons may be required to serve sentences of imprisonment or detention
passed under the Naval Discipline Act, the Army Act, 1955, or the Air
Force Act, 1955;
(c) "prison officer" includes any member of the staff of a prison;
(d) "prisoner" means a person who is undergoing imprisonment or detention
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in a prison, whether under sentence or not, or who, while liable to im-

prisonment or detention in a prison, is unlawfully at large;
(e) "theft" includes any offence which involves stealing or is done with intent
to steal.
6.-(1) A person convicted of murder shall be liable to the same punishment
as heretofore, if before conviction of that murder he has, whether before or after
the commencement of this Act, been convicted of another murder done on a
different occasion (both murders having been done in Great Britain).
(2) Where a person is charged with the murder of two or more persons, no
rule of practice shall prevent the murders being charged in the same indictment
or (unless separate trials are desirable in the interests of justice) prevent them
being tried together; and where a person is convicted of two murders tried
together (but done on different occasions), subsection (1) of this section shall
apply as if one conviction had preceded the other.
7. No person shall be liable to suffer death for murder in any case not falling
within section five or six of this Act.
8.-(1) The foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act shall not have effect
in relation to courts-martial, but a person convicted by a court-martial of murder (or of an offence corresponding thereto under section seventy of the Army
Act, 1955, or of the Air Force Act, 1955) shall not be liable to suffer death,

unless he is charged with and convicted of committing the offence under circumstances which, if he had committed it in England, would make him guilty
of capital murder.
(2) An accused so charged before a court-martial under the Naval Discipline
Act may, on failure of proof of the offence having been committed under such
circumstances as aforesaid, be found guilty of the murder as not having been
committed under such circumstances.
9.-(1) Where a court (including a court-martial) is precluded by this Part
of this Act from passing sentence of death, the sentence shall be one of imprisonment for life.
(2) Accordingly paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of section seventy of the
Army Act, 1955, and of the Air Force Act, 1955, and the first paragraph of
section forty-five of the Naval Discipline Act, shall each be amended by the
addition, at the end of the paragraph, of the words "or, in a case of murder not
falling within section eight of the Homicide Act, 1957, imprisonment for life."
(3) In section fifty-three of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, and
in section fifty-seven of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937,
there shall be substituted for subsection (1)"(1) Sentence of death shall not be pronounced on or recorded against a
person convicted of an offence who appears to the court to have been under
the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was committed, nor shall any
such person be sentenced to imprisonment for life under section nine of the
Homicide Act, 1957; but in lieu thereof the court shall (notwithstanding anything in this or any other Act) sentence him to be detained during Her Majesty's
pleasure, and if so sentenced he shall be liable to be detained in such place and
under such conditions as the Secretary of State may direct."
(4) The provisions of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect with
respect to procedural and other matters arising out of sections five to seven of
this Act, and with respect to the convictions which may be taken into account
under section six....
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